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ABSTRACT 
 
Using survey data on traders and brokers in the Ethiopian foodgrain market, 
this paper reveals that the brokerage institution is critical to market 
performance in that it enables traders to circumvent the commitment problem 
of long-distance trade with unknown partners.  In the absence of grain 
standardization, public information, and legal contract enforcement, brokers 
act as inspectors and guarantors of each transaction.  The paper analyzes the 
sources of commitment failure, the role and functions of brokers and the 
extent of brokerage use by brokers and argues that agency relations are not 
based on ethnicity, depend on effective reputation rather than trust, and are 
structured in an incentive-compatible manner. 
   1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The effective functioning of foodgrain markets is vital to economic growth and to 
national food security.  However, following Polanyi (1957), it is widely recognized 
that market transactions, particularly in developing countries, are frequently 
embedded in long-term, personalized, relationships (Granovetter 1985; Plattner 
1989; Harriss-White 1993).   At the same time, North and Thomas (1973) have 
argued strongly that the evolution from personalized exchange to impersonal or 
anonymous exchange, supported by legal systems that enforce contracts, is 
central to the process of growth and development.  In the absence of formalized 
market institutions that deter dishonest behavior, such as credit bureaus, trade 
inspection services, and commercial tribunals, what institutions arise that 
promote trade among unknown parties? 
 
This paper analyzes the features and structure of the institution of grain brokers 
in the Ethiopian grain market.  Using primary data collected in a survey of 169 
Ethiopian traders and brokers in 12 markets, this paper has two objectives.  First, 
the paper seeks to demonstrate that brokers, operating as intermediaries or 
commission agents in the exchange of grain between wholesalers, enable these 
wholesalers to circumvent the commitment failure problem that is intrinsic to   2
long-distance trade with unknown partners in a market with weak information and 
limited contract enforcement.  Second, the paper addresses the agency relations 
prevailing between wholesalers (traders) and brokers and demonstrates that the 
brokerage institution is sustained by underlying incentive-compatible norms that 
limit conflict between traders and brokers. 
 
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
Historical institutional analysis of pre-modern trade in medieval Europe by 
Milgrom et al. (1990) shows that an institution, known as the Law Merchant in 
12
th and 13
th century Champagne fairs, enabled impersonal exchange to occur.   
The Law Merchant enabled trade through a reputation system that stored 
information about traders’ past behavior and sanctioned violators of the 
commercial code.   
 
Similarly, Greif (1993) views the Maghribi traders’ coalition in the 11
th century as 
a means of overcoming the commitment problem intrinsic to long distance trade.  
Clay (1993) shows that coalitions of long-distance traders in 19
th century 
Mexican California promoted honest exchange through information sharing and 
punishing of cheaters.  In contrast, Platteau (1994a, 1994b) argues that 
decentralized arrangements based on reputation are not sufficient to ensure 
honest behavior and that private and public-order institutions are necessary to 
create the social conditions for markets to operate.      3
 
Fafchamps (1996a) demonstrates theoretically that decentralized markets can 
spontaneously emerge in the presence of commitment failure, despite the 
absence of formal courts, if agents are sufficiently heterogeneous.  However, 
economic efficiency is not fully realized as exchange is not anonymous and is 
based on mutual trust and information sharing.    Kranton (1996) shows that less 
efficient personalized exchange relations, such as the reciprocal exchange of 
goods and services, can persist even when impersonal exchange is possible if 
the size of the personalized market is initially large, goods are homogenous, and 
individuals are interconnected in networks. 
 
COMMITMENT FAILURE IN THE ETHIOPIAN GRAIN MARKET 
In the Ethiopian grain market, the price of grain is not publicly known, grain is 
highly differentiated with no formal standardization and classification, and there 
are very limited legal means to enforce contracts (Dadi et al. 1992).   These 
various constraints cause traders to be relatively easily cheated with regard to 
the appropriate market price, the quality and quantity of the delivered grain, or 
other contractual terms such as the timing of delivery, grain spoilage or loss 
during transport, inter alia.   This commitment problem severely inhibits traders   4
from placing orders with other traders in distant markets or, in general, from 
trading with unknown merchants, even if they physically meet.  Traders 
circumvent this problem through engaging the services of an established broker, 
who serves as an intermediary between partners who do not have a previous 
relationship and may never meet. 
 
THE FUNCTION OF ETHIOPIAN GRAIN BROKERS 
Brokers are agents, operating on a commission basis, who only transact on 
behalf of a principal.  They are located permanently in the central market of 
Addis Ababa and are able to obtain market information relatively easily.  There 
are approximately 40 established brokers in the ehil berenda, the country’s 
central market in Addis Ababa, relative to a total of roughly 2500 licensed grain 
wholesalers in the entire country (Lirenso, 1993).  Each broker has a clientele of 
regional traders, with whom he has cultivated a long-term relationship that may 
span generations.    
 
Ethiopian grain brokers, known as delala, function in much the same way as 
commission agents or brokers in highly sophisticated market exchanges around 
the world.  The main function of brokers in the Ethiopian central market is to 
facilitate market exchange through matching buyers and sellers who come from 
markets located in outlying regions.  Secondly, brokers provide a mechanism for 
obtaining a market price at which goods clear the market, a function known as   5
price discovery on commodity exchanges.
1    In the Ethiopian grain market, 
brokers set a daily spot price for each type and origin of grain (30-40 different 
prices) through an implicit bidding process.  Thus, each broker makes a rapid 
evaluation of the day’s supply and demand, fixes a price, then adjusts it 
according to what other brokers have fixed, in a tâtonnement process which 
results in a single market price.  The Ethiopian price discovery process closely 
resembles what is known as Ring trading in the London metals market, in which 
brokers determine the price of each metal within a pre-set time period through 
explicitly bidding on price (Gibson-Jarvie 1993).
2     
 
BROKERS IN OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Brokerage in foodgrain markets is also documented elsewhere across Africa.  
N.W. Thomas (1908) reports historical evidence of brokers throughout northeast, 
and to a lesser extent central and western, Africa.  Historically, brokers appear to 
have played a major role in the food trade of the western Sudan and are linked 
to the presence of Hausa traders (Cohen 1969; Meillassoux 1971; Jones 1972).  
Gilbert (1969) finds evidence of brokers in nearly all studied food markets in  
                                                 
1   See Commodity Trading Manual, Chicago Board of Trade, 1989. 
2   Other examples of a similar system are found in the London bullion market which informally 
determines the London “Gold Fix,” a daily gold price set by brokers.   6
northern Nigeria, where brokers, known as dillali, are generally of the dominant 
ethnic group.  Hill (1966) documents the activities of “landlord-brokers” in food 
markets in the Kumasi market of Ghana, similar to the role of logeurs in Mali 
(Amselle 1969).   
 
Elsewhere, Lele (1971) describes the role of Indian commission agents in the 
foodgrain market, known as adatya in Mahareshtra or dalal in Hindustani, who 
operate in a manner closely resembling that of Ethiopian brokers.  Scott (1985) 
documents the existence of commission agents in the Cañete Valley of Peru, 
who facilitate exchange between potato producers in the Valley and wholesalers 
in Lima.  
 
Thus, the same word, derived from Arabic, is used to describe brokers in 
Ethiopia (delala), Nigeria (dillali) and India (dalal), possibly revealing that the 
practice of brokerage may originate in Muslim commercial practices.  Pankhurst 
(1961) documents reports by Marco Polo of “merchants of all nations” trading in 
12
th century Ethiopia, while Alvarez (1881) describes the influence of foreign 
traders including “Moors, from Giada (Jeddah), Morocco, Fez, Tunis, Turks, 
Greeks, Moors from India, Ormuz, and Cairo” actively trading in Ethiopia in the 
13
th century.
3   Jackson (1978) also notes the existence of Muslim-dominated 
trade routes transversing pre-modern Ethiopia. 
                                                 
3     Pankhurst, 1961, p. 307.   7
2.  DATA AND SURVEY METHODS 
 
 
THE STUDY AREAS 
 
An extensive survey was carried out in 1996 by the author in seven regions of 
Ethiopia.  These regions comprised 3 grain surplus areas— Wollega, Arsi, and 
Gojjam, and 3 grain deficit areas –Wollo, Tigray, and Hararghe— in addition to 
the central urban market of Addis Ababa.  Wollega is a major maize-producing 
region, Arsi is a major wheat-producing region, and Gojjam is a major teff -
producing region (Figure 1).   
 
A total of 12 markets were selected on the basis of their importance as centers 
of wholesale grain trade and as transit points for grain flows across the country.   
Surveyed markets are Nekempte and Jaji in the Wollega region, Assela and 
Sagure in the Arsi region, Bahir Dar and Bure in the Gojjam region, Dessie and 
Kombolcha in the Wollo region, Mekele in the Tigray region, Dire Dawa and 
Harar in the Hararghe region, and Addis Ababa.  The grains included in the study 
are principally teff (an indigenous grain uniquely unique to Ethiopia), wheat, and 
maize, although transaction data were also collected for barley, millet, and 
sorghum.   
   8
THE SURVEY 
 
Panel data were obtained in two rounds of trader and broker surveys carried out 
in May-July 1996 and October-December 1996.   In each market, a random 
selection of existing traders in the market was taken, given the unavailability of a 
reliable census of traders from official sources.  The total sample includes 169 
traders, comprised of 152 wholesale traders in 12 markets and 17 grain brokers 
in the Addis Ababa market. 
 
Data were collected in the first round on traders’ choices of trading 
arrangements, transfer costs, relations with brokers, market channels, traders’ 
resources and assets, and demographic variables.  A separate broker survey 
collected data on brokers’ assets, client base, price formation, and transactions.   
 
In the second round of the trader survey, in addition to data on traders’ 
contractual choices and transfer costs, data were collected on traders’ 
transaction costs of search, liquidity, and social capital.   The second round of 
the broker survey collected data on price differentiation and quality parameters, 
social capital, and demographic variables.  Although the government ban on 
private trade was lifted in 1990, traders remained suspicious of interviewers and 
reluctant to provide cost and flow information.  Given the sensitivity of these data 
and their qualitative nature, the author’s presence at nearly all interviews 
ensured a high level of quality of responses.   9
3.  THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DELALA 
 
 
Grain brokers operate from permanent market stalls in the central grain market, 
the ehil berenda, in Addis Ababa.   On average, interviewed brokers handled 
transactions for clients in about 6 markets around the country, with an average of 
60 clients per broker.   Field interviews revealed that the amount of grain flowing 
through brokerage channels ranged from 1411 quintals per week (1.4 tons) in a 
low-volume month such as April to a high of 2789 quintals (2.8 tons) per week in 
a busy month such as January or February (Table 1).   Roughly extrapolating 
these figures for the estimated number of 50 established brokers operating in the 
market results in 1,102 tons of grain handled weekly by Addis Ababa brokers, or 
52,917 tons over the marketing year.
4  
 
Among the clients handled by each broker, the largest share were distant sellers, 
with an average of 38 seller clients per broker.  In the case of distant sellers and 
distant buyers, brokers may handle orders exclusively by telephone.  Interviewed 
brokers indicated that they could work solely by telephone with 77 percent of 
their seller clients and 20 percent of their buyer clients (Table 4).  Thus, distant 
buyers are more likely to come themselves to the market.  This may be due to 
                                                 
4   Lirenso (1993) estimates for 1992 that 342 regional wholesalers from 64 market towns shipped 
1,354 tons weekly to 50 brokers.     10
the higher risk of commitment failure faced by buyers, who are more vulnerable 
to cheating on the quality or price of the grain.    
 
For each transaction, the broker’s functions can be broken down into six distinct 
services.   Initially, prior to receiving a shipment of grain, the broker provides 
market information and business advice to a wholesaler client, who is interested 
in either selling or buying.   Traders in distant markets will send a shipment of 
grain after consulting with their broker about prevailing market conditions and 
prices.   
 
Once the grain is shipped, a second service provided by the broker is the 
receiving of grain in a given physical space.  Even if the grain is not off-loaded 
from the transport vehicle, upon arrival in Addis Ababa, the truck is parked in 
front of the broker’s stall.  The parking space in front of the broker’s stall 
represents the point of entry into the next day’s trading, since the shipment of 
grain must be physically present and visible to incoming buyers.  
 
Third, the broker fulfills the role of inspection and grading of the incoming grain.   
At the point of receiving the grain, in the case of a sales order, the broker 
inspects the sacks of grain on the truck.  In order to ascertain the quality of the 
grain, the broker uses a pointed tubular device, known as memermeria, to take 
samples randomly from different sacks within a shipment.   The broker’s   11
experience in gauging grain qualities and his knowledge of current market 
conditions enables him to determine what the market-clearing price of each 
quality and type of grain is. 
 
Fourth, brokers set the market price for each of the types of grain they receive.  
According to interviewed brokers, brokers each set an average of 7.30 prices 
daily.  The time required for brokers to set prices ranges between 15 and 30 
minutes, or about 6 minutes per price (Table 2).   The price discovery function of 
brokers involves an evaluation of the day’s supply and demand conditions prior 
to the start of the market day at 6 am.  Using the previous day’s closing price as 
a basis, brokers “fix” a market price for each quality of grain they have received 
from regional clients.  They each informally conduct a survey of prices 
simultaneously announced by other brokers that handle the same origins and 
types of grain, after which they may adjust the price accordingly.   Within a few 
minutes, this process results in a single daily spot price for each grain, by type, 
regional origin, and quality.   Field observations revealed that there were roughly 
40 to 50 different prices of grain daily, varying by type of grain, region of origin, 
variety, and quality, set by brokers in the Addis Ababa market.  
 
Brokers indicated that the daily spot price might hold for the entire period of a 
day’s trading, between 6 and 9 am.  Typically, however, the price changes 1 to 2 
times in the trading period, as brokers try to clear remaining supplies of grain.    12
Thus, two-thirds of the sampled brokers revealed that the market price changes 
two or three times daily.  
 
Fifth, brokers search for buyers or sellers of grain on behalf of their clients.  The 
search process involves extensively discussing with other brokers, touring the 
marketplace by foot talking to buyers, and having assistants standing on top of 
trucks shouting out the available types and qualities of grain.   
 
At the point of sale or purchase, a sixth service provided by brokers is arranging 
the handling of the grain, for which each broker has a staff of laborers who off-
load, re-sack, and weigh grain for a fixed fee.  Brokers handle transport logistics 
either through paying the transport fees of the transporter out of the sales 
proceeds or arranging for transport for a buyer.  
 
When a sale is completed on behalf of a client, brokers deduct their commission 
and remit the funds to the regional seller.  If the grain has not been sold and the 
seller is short of funds, brokers may extend sales advance to valued clients.   
Brokers indicated that they provide this service to roughly 40 percent of their 
clientele (Table 1).  Unsold grain is off-loaded to the broker’s warehouse where it 
is stored for a monthly rental fee.    Brokers reported an average capacity of 938 
quintals (9.4 tons), of which close to 200 quintals (20 percent) , were of client’s 
unsold stock (Table 1).     13
 
Depending on their relationship with their client, brokers may provide buyer credit 
up to 30 days.   Brokers consider offering this service to approximately one-third 
of all their clients (Table 1).   14
4.  THE INCIDENCE OF BROKERAGE USE 
 
 
In addition to using brokers, traders can also use an agent, a salaried employee 
who is located in a different market and acts as an agent on their behalf or 
exchange directly themselves with a buyer or a seller.  Each of these three 
arrangements can occur either in the same market in which the trader is located 
or in an outside market, resulting in six different choices for exchange.  
 
The choice of brokerage by traders varies according to the type (sale versus 
purchase) of transaction as well as the location (surplus, deficit, or central zone) 
of the transaction.  Thus, traders in markets located in surplus regions (42 
percent of sample respondents) exhibit different choices than traders in deficit 
regions (34 percent of sample) and traders in the central market (24 percent of 
sample).     
 
THE USE OF BROKERAGE BY MARKET AND TRANSACTION TYPE  
 
Traders in surplus regions reported use of local brokers for 7.5 percent of all 
transactions and  of distant brokers for 15.4 percent of all purchase transactions.  
In contrast, they used local brokers for 9.4  percent of all sales and distant 
brokers for 47.1  percent of all sales transactions.  The low incidence of   15
brokerage for purchases is due to purchases directly from farmers, while the 
higher share of distant brokerage for sales is due to their sales of grain in the 
central market of Addis Ababa (Figure 2).
5 
 
In the case of traders located in deficit zones, traders indicated using local 
brokers for 17.8 percent of all purchases and distant brokers for 31.6 percent of 
all purchases.   The use of brokerage for sales by traders in deficit markets was 
significantly lower, 7.1 percent of local brokers and 3.1 percent of distant 
brokers.   This pattern is due to the fact that traders sold grain directly to local 
retailers as well as consumers. 
 
Finally, due to their location, central market traders only use local brokerage, with 
10.8 percent for local purchases and 7.4 percent for local sales, and no distant 
brokerage at all, since central market traders tend to make transactions only 
locally.  Wholesalers in the central market can buy directly from regional sellers 
who bring grain to the central market and can sell directly to local retailers, 
consumers, and millers.  
                                                 
5   The data used are self-reported figures provided by traders, recalling transactions over a six-
month horizon.  Given the low frequency of transactions, the recall period does not greatly 
increase error.  Two observations of contractual choice data were gathered from two survey 
rounds.   The results of the two rounds have been pooled, which provides a better estimation of 
the true values. Correlations between rounds are significant for data on the use of brokers and of 
self-search. 
   16
For the sample of traders as a whole, without distinguishing by type of 
transaction, brokerage is used in roughly one-quarter of all transactions.   
Traders search on their own, either locally or in distant markets, in 72 percent of 
transactions (Table 3).   These results are revealing in that, while the majority of 
traders (85 percent) indicate using brokers regularly in their transactions, the 
actual incidence of brokerage is low relative to direct trade.  The co-existence of 
direct exchange and brokerage appears linked to the use of brokers for 
transactions in distant markets, sales for surplus market sellers and purchases 
for deficit market buyers.  17 
5.  COMMITMENT FAILURE AND THE ROLE OF BROKERS 
 
The geographic dispersion of supply and demand centers of grain in Ethiopia 
necessitates transfers of grain over long distances.  However, relations among 
traders located in different regions are characterized by a commitment problem.   
The commitment problem arises because traders have limited information about 
market conditions in distant markets and because neither the grain itself, nor the 
sacks in which it is transported, nor the contractual terms under which it 
exchanges hands are standardized across all parties in the market.   
 
SOURCES OF COMMITMENT FAILURE IN LONG-DISTANCE TRADE 
Interviewed traders reported that partners can, and do, cheat by delivering a 
lower quality of grain than was discussed at the time of sale.  Since there are no 
official inspections of grain, a trader who contacts a partner by telephone is 
forced to take the partner’s word at face value.  Furthermore, grain quality can 
deteriorate in the course of storage or transport to the buyer.   
 
The relevant parameters of quality for Ethiopian grain are color, taste, 
appearance of kernels, moisture content, impurity, breakage of kernels, and18 
baking qualities.
6  These parameters, qualitative in nature, are open to 
considerably different interpretations. Traders can cheat by misquoting or 
omitting information on any of the above parameters at the time of oral 
agreement of the grain price.  Furthermore, long-distance orders are placed by 
telephone with no legal contract, traders can cheat by denying contract terms.  
 
Other opportunities to cheat are presented by the lack of standardized sacks.  
Traders indicate that sacks, re-used numerous times, vary dramatically in terms 
of the quantity they carry and their quality.  Traders can cheat partners by having 
sacks that hold less than the 100 kilograms that they are presumed to hold (if the 
cheater is a seller).  In small rural markets where there are no scales, traders are 
reported to cheat farmers routinely by buying grain in sacks that hold 
considerably more than 100 kilograms.  Moreover, the practice of re-using sacks 
also creates room for opportunistic behavior.  Traders report that buying a load 
of grain in the sacks of the selling merchant is undesirable because the seller will 
provide the oldest possible sacks, which are likely to tear and cause grain loss or 
damage over the course of transport.    
 
The commitment problem is also a function of the point at which ownership of 
grain is transferred between partners.  When a seller retains ownership, and 
                                                 
6  Brokers revealed in interviews that they use these parameters to determine the appropriate price. 19 
concomitant risk, for a shipment of grain until it reaches the final destination, the 
trader is highly vulnerable to reneging on the buyer’s part.  Similarly, if the buyer 
takes ownership of a load of grain at the seller’s venue, the buyer is highly 
vulnerable to fraudulent representation of the grain or damage during transport.   
 
In the event that cheating occurs, recourse to a legal third party is very limited in 
Ethiopia.  In part, the lack of legal recourse is due to the time-consuming nature 
and inaccessibility of formal courts.  Moreover, it is not customary for business 
partners to engage in legal suits, also true elsewhere in Africa (Berry, 1993).  
According to interviewed traders, a trader who has been cheated by a partner 
must return to the market in order to seek out the wrongdoer and engage in a 
public confrontation.  When the partner is unfound or a settlement cannot be 
reached, the trader bears the loss.   
 
THE ROLE OF BROKERS IN ALLEVIATING COMMITMENT FAILURE 
 
This commitment problem causes traders to be extremely reluctant to trade with 
partners whom they don’t know.   Without an institution to promote trade, 
exchange between anonymous, long-distance, partners would rarely occur 
because traders would anticipate cheating by their partners.  Yet there is ample 
evidence that grain is traded considerable distances around Ethiopia and that 
cheating is the exception, rather than the norm.    
 20 
How does brokerage resolve the commitment problem?   As neutral 
intermediaries, brokers are uniquely able to gather information from a large 
number of traders.  The majority of interviewed traders asserted that the broker’s 
access to traders and the broker’s superior market information were the primary 
reasons for using a broker. Close to 40 percent of traders cite brokers’ access to 
more contacts as most important in their choice while 25 percent list the broker’s 
access to information as most important in their choice (Table 4).  Conversely, 
when traders feel they know the market or have sufficiently trustworthy partners, 
they don’t use brokers.   More than half of interviewed brokers (53 percent) noted 
that knowing the market well enough justified not using a broker while 26 percent 
indicated that a broker was unnecessary when they had well-known trading 
partners. 
 
Brokers generally do not trade on their own account, with less than 10 percent of 
transactions on their own account (Table 5).  While they do not bear market price 
risk, they are held accountable in the event of a breach of contract.   Brokers 
enumerate their role as guarantors or witnesses of each transaction as important 
among the services they provide.  Through their intermediation, they ensure that 
imnet, or trust, is present in the long-distance transaction.  
 
Location is a key aspect of the role played by brokers.  Because brokers are 
permanently located in the central market, they are easily identifiable to all 21 
traders who come in and out of the market.  Thus, they are natural repositories 
of information, regarding market flows, the behavior of market participants, and 
the outcomes of past transactions.  Their permanent presence in the central 
market ensures the continuity of a reputation transmission mechanism.  In 
addition, their continuous presence implies that, in the event that a falling out 
between partners occurs during a long-distance trade, the broker can be 
contacted to mediate and resolve the dispute.  
 
Despite the lack of formal barriers to becoming a broker, the number of brokers 
is relatively small.  Interviews with brokers revealed that brokers view the imnet 
(trust) they have acquired from their network of traders as a critical asset in their 
business.  Thus 60 percent of brokers had a parent in grain trade, and 40 
percent had a parent in grain brokerage (Table 5). Grain brokerage businesses 
pass from generation to generation, transferring the imnet gradually from the 
father to the son, who acquires the father’s clients.  The high value placed on the 
broker’s work is similar to the importance of xinyong, or trust, in traditional 
Chinese trading practices in southeast Asia, which is also transferred across 
generations  (Menkoff 1994).
7  
 
                                                 
7   The existence of trust is the most frequent explanation given by Chinese traders for their 
success in business.  The necessity “to trust trust”  is among the safeguards against the possible 
breach of business commitments (see Menkoff in Dieter-Evers and Schrader, 1994; Fukuyama, 
1995, Tadelis, 1997). 22 
6.  AGENCY RELATIONS BETWEEN TRADERS AND BROKERS 
 
 
While brokers enable traders to circumvent the commitment problem with other 
traders, what prevents brokers from abusing their trust (imnet) with their clients?   
 
TRADERS’ DEPENDENCE ON BROKERS 
 
Several key features of the relationship between brokers and traders emerge 
from the data.   First, a large proportion of Ethiopian grain traders (85 percent of 
sample) use brokers regularly.  Most traders have long-term working relations 
with their brokers, with a sample average of 6 years.  Interviewed brokers report 
that 87 percent of their clients were long-term (see Table 6). 
8  
 
The reliance on brokers among regional traders is far greater than that of traders 
located in the central market, where only 54 percent report regular use of 
brokerage (Table 7).  The level of dependence on brokerage, as measured by 
whether traders perceived it was possible to carry out long-distance trade without 
brokers, varied across regions.  A greater share of traders in surplus markets, 
ranging from 26 percent to 70 percent of traders, felt they could not operate in 
distant markets without a broker while all traders in the deficit regions (with the 
exception of Wollo) and the central market considered it possible to trade without 
                                                 
8 Similarly, Fafchamps (1996b) finds an average of 4.1 years of business relations among firms in Ghana. 23 
brokers.  In general, regional buyers are more likely to travel the distance to the 
central market and purchase the grain themselves, while regional sellers are 
more likely to closely work with a broker, using telephone transactions.    This 
may have to do with the opportunity cost of time faced by regional sellers of 
grain, who are busy purchasing grain from smaller rural markets, and whose 
business would suffer if they were obliged to physically travel to the central 
market for each long-distance sale.  
 
Another aspect of the dependence of traders on brokers was whether traders 
worked exclusively with a single broker or whether they worked with a number of 
brokers.   Traders in surplus regions, as well as in Wollo, appear to follow the 
practice of working with a single broker, with 74 percent to 100 percent of traders 
in these markets following this practice (Table 7).  In contrast, a smaller share 
(20 percent - 40 percent) of traders in the deficit regions and the central market 
followed this practice.   Thus, while the usage of brokers is equally widespread 
among regional buyers and sellers, long-distance grain sellers appear to be 
markedly more dependent on brokers than long-distance grain buyers.   
ETHNICITY IN TRADER-BROKER RELATIONS 
 
While the proportion of traders with the same ethnic origin as their broker ranged 
between regions from 8 percent to 54 percent, overall, only 26 percent of traders 
were from the same region as their brokers.   As further confirmation, only 4 
percent of traders revealed that they had “kinship” ties with their brokers (Table 24 
7).  Interviewed brokers reported that, on average, only 16 percent of distant 
buyer clients and 18 percent of distant seller clients were from the same region.   
The absence of ethnicity as a basis of agency relations is a striking departure 
from other studies of trust-based trading networks, in which ethnicity plays a 
major role (Fafchamps 1992,1996; Greif 1993; Dieter-Evers  1994). 
 
 
TRANSPARENCE OF TRADE-BROKER RELATIONS 
 
The absence of a public market information system and the physical distance 
between regional traders and central market brokers in Ethiopia result in high 
monitoring costs for traders to monitor brokers’ actions.  Traders indicate that 
they are always suspicious of possible cheating by brokers.  Traders suspect 
that brokers occasionally “skim” additional profits off the actual price that they 
obtain in the market as opposed to the price that they convey to the trader.  This 
is called ferq and is a source of conflict between traders and brokers.  In all 
regions, the majority of traders indicated that they regularly cross-check 
information provided by their broker.  The proportion of traders who carry out 
cross-checks ranges from 65 percent to 100 percent, and was 79 percent of the 
sample as a whole (Table 8).   
 
The extent to which brokers are open about the trading partner (buyer or seller) 
with whom their client has exchanged grain is an indication of the transparence 
of agency relations.   Brokers who regularly reveal the identity of the partner or 25 
who introduce the trading parties may be less likely to behave opportunistically.  
At the same time, traders may use partner disclosure to bypass using the broker 
in future trading. 
 
Wide discrepancy exists in the share of traders who reported regularly being 
informed of their partners’ identities, ranging from 0 percent in Wollega to 100 
percent in Tigray, while overall 64 percent of traders reported being informed 
(Table 8).  With the exception of Wollo, more traders in deficit regions were 
provided with this information, probably due to the greater number of regional 
buyers who went themselves to the central market to conduct purchases.   
Traders reported knowing their partner, on average, for 68 percent of all 
transactions.   However, this also varied by region, with traders in deficit regions 
having a larger share of transactions in which they knew their partner.   From the 
brokers’ perspective, interviewed brokers estimated that their clients meet their 
trading partners for 54 percent of the transactions they handle (see Table 6). 
Addressing the question whether traders attempt to bypass their brokers when 
they know who their trading partner is, traders and brokers provided widely 
divergent responses.    Only 21 percent of brokers considered that direct 
exchange is likely in the event that trading partners meet (Table 6).  They stated 
that direct exchange was unlikely primarily because their clients were unwilling to 
risk transacting without a witness.  In addition, brokers stated that trader would 
not engage in future direct exchange with a partner found by a broker since this 26 
would compromise their relations and restrict the trader’s pool of possible 
partners to a single partner.  This implies that brokers would consider ending the 
working relationship in the event that a client trader attempted direct exchange, if 
the broker found out.   
 
In contrast, a large share of traders (76 percent) indicated that they would 
consider direct exchange with a partner whom they had met through their broker. 
In the event that they were to engage in direct contact, 65 percent of traders 
indicated that they were willing to engage in transactions using only telephone 
contact, without personally meeting the new partner.   On the other hand, the 
large majority, 83 percent, indicated that they would not be willing to extend 
supplier credit to the new partner.  In response to how many repeated 
exchanges were necessary in order to create a trusting relationship with a 
previously unknown partner, on average, traders required 9-10 transactions with 
the same trader in order to establish trust with a partner.   The fact that direct 
exchange may cause conflict with their broker was confirmed by roughly 40 
percent of the sample (Table 8). 
 
Thus, it would appear that there is limited transparence in the agency relations 
between traders and brokers, given that not all traders are ever informed of their 
trading partners and those that are informed are not informed at all times.  
Further, agency relations appear influenced by the implicit threat by brokers that 27 
traders who use this information to bypass the broker will be “punished” by losing 
their working relations.  
 
CONFLICT IN TRADER-BROKER RELATIONS 
 
In previous sections, two sources of conflict between traders and brokers were 
noted.   Conflict may arise when traders suspect price misinformation by brokers 
or when traders attempt to bypass their broker and exchange directly with 
partners whom their broker found in a previous transaction.     
 
Among interviewed traders, roughly one-third (34 percent) had experienced 
conflict with their broker, with a sample average of 1.5 conflicts in the past 
marketing year (Table 9).  The number of conflicts varied widely between and 
within regions.   Comparing the number of conflicts with brokers to the number of 
conflicts traders experienced with trading partners, traders experienced less 
conflict with their brokers than with the sum of partner conflicts, both using a 
broker and not using a broker.    
 
The majority of traders (65 percent of sample) used informal mediation as a 
means of resolving conflicts, with the share of traders using this option ranging 
from 40 percent to 100 percent.  With the exception of a single region, Hararghe, 
no traders employed legal recourse to resolve conflicts with their brokers (Table 
9).   Thus, agency relations are characterized by relatively little conflict, the 28 
absence of legal recourse, and the prevalence of informal mediation by 
members of the trading community.  The widespread use of informal mediation, 
rather than legal recourse, is consistent with the existence of generalized social 
norms that govern economic relations (Platteau, 1994b).   
 
MECHANISMS TO LIMIT CHEATING BY BROKERS 
 
Without institutional constraints limiting the possibility of opportunistic behavior 
by brokers, trader-broker relations would be characterized by a higher incidence 
of conflict and would not be self-enforcing.  What are the mechanisms for limiting 
opportunistic behavior on the part of brokers and reducing conflict?   29 
Effective Reputation Mechanism 
Agency relations are structured in a manner that provides a means for 
sanctioning brokers’ actions.   Field interviews revealed that, not only do a 
significant share of traders engage in exclusive relations with a single broker, but 
that it is also quite common that most traders in a given regional market tend to 
work with the same one or two brokers in the central market.
9    On the surface, 
this structure may appear to give brokers significant market power vis-à-vis the 
individual traders in a market.  More importantly, this structure offers a safety net 
for individual traders in that information provided by the broker flows freely 
among all traders in a given market.  This enables a reputation system to work 
by the implicit threat that a broker who cheats one client is likely to compromise 
relations with all clients in that market and nearby markets in the region.  
Evidence that traders actually do carry out sanctions and effectively boycott a 




                                                 
9   Thus, brokers in Addis Ababa are each specialized in handling transactions from a particular 
set of markets in a region.  Brokers who handle grain from the same area have their stalls 
adjacent to each other, enabling the rapid transmission of price and market information. 
10   Many, though not all, traders interviewed in the market town of Nekempte in Wollega region 
had collectively boycotted a broker located in the central market and had collectively switched to 
another broker. 30 
Brokers’ Incentive Compatibility: The Absence of “Marketmaking” 
 
A second means of limiting opportunistic behavior by brokers lies in the incentive 
compatibility of brokers relative to their clients.  A potential source of conflict in 
agency relations would exist if brokers, trading on their own account, bought and 
sold grain from their own clients.
11   Field interviews revealed that very few grain 
brokers buy or sell clients’ grain on their account, at least overtly, in the interests 
of maintaining neutrality vis-à-vis their client traders.
12  Thus, the grain market 
structure does not have a role for “marketmakers,” who openly purchase 
unmatched orders at a discount (the bid price) and sell unmatched orders at a 
premium (the ask price), in order to create a market for those willing to pay the 
price of immediacy (Demsetz 1968).   
 
If a partner is not found for a client, the majority of brokers stated that they would 
store their clients’ grain in their warehouses, either at a charge (71 percent of 
brokers) or without charge (14 percent), or in another warehouse (7 percent).   A 
small share of brokers (7 percent) indicated that they would buy or sell their 
clients’ grain themselves, although this would be at the market price (see Table 
                                                 
11   A number of commodity exchanges, such as the Chicago Board of Trade, prohibit house 
trading by brokers, in order to limit “frontrunning,” when brokers trade on their own accounts 
before placing clients’ orders of which they have a priori information.  
 
12   While brokers stated that they do not trade directly with their own clients, many are engaged in 
grain trade.  Thus, brokers may conduct undetected “frontrunning”, in which case they would be 
reluctant to reveal the identity of the matched partner. 
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7).
13   Interviewed brokers reiterated that trading on their own accounts was 
considered a serious breach of the implicit rules governing agency relations.  
Because information on buy and sell orders, on a given trading day, is 
incomplete, traders cannot confirm a broker’s information that a partner was 
unavailable.  Brokers would only be willing to transact at a rate more favorable 
than the market, thus causing a strain in their relations with clients.  The 
implication of the absence of marketmaking is that brokers never assume market 
risk and that markets are relatively less liquid. 
 
For their part, traders reported no sales or purchases directly from brokers, 
indicating that brokers who do trade with their own clients may be doing so 
covertly.  Traders insisted that brokers never offer them this option, which would 
be greatly preferred since they gain immediacy and transfer market risk to the 
broker. 
 
Brokers’ Incentive Compatibility: Fixed and Flat-Rate Commissions 
 
Ethiopian grain brokers are compensated for their services with a fixed 
commission that is a flat rate per quantity transacted, rather than a percentage of 
the final transaction price. This practice is common to all regions studied in 
 
 
13   Matching remaining orders at the market price would not be economically rational behavior for 
a broker, who would incur market risk in the process.  This action would only be justified in the 
interests of favoring a long-term client. 32 
Ethiopia and confirmed by 93 percent of sampled brokers (see Table 7).  Lirenso 
(1993) also noted this payment system in the Ethiopian grain market in 1992.  
Field interviews revealed that the flat fee is fixed across brokers and across time, 
but varies according to regions.
14   Brokers noted that fees were invariant across 
time because they represented the brokers’ fixed operating costs.    Brokers 
attributed regional differences in brokerage fees to “convention,” however, they 
may be linked to the fact that certain regions have higher volume of trading than 
others.   Also, brokerage fees charged to buyers are typically higher than fees to 
sellers.
15  This may be to the higher level of service provided by buyer’s brokers, 
who not only find a match but who also must ascertain the quality of the grain 
and inspect the shipment for signs of cheating by the seller.    
 
The practice of fixed brokerage fees has also been noted elsewhere, in rural 
Indian foodgrain markets by Lele (1971) and in northern Nigerian grain markets 
by Gilbert (1969).   Historical records from the late 19
th century indicate that 
brokerage fees for grain traded on the Chicago Board of Trade were flat fees per 
quantity and fixed across time.
16    This is also true of other international 
                                                 
14   Brokers charge different fees for grain coming from different regions.  The fee is the same for 
all brokers handling grain from the same region, and changes in the fee are jointly determined by 
the brokers. 
 
15   Sales brokerage fees range from Birr 1.00 to Birr 1.20, while purchase brokerage fees are Birr 
2.00. 
16   See the Thirtieth Annual Report of the Trade and Commerce of Chicago, 1887. 33 
commodity markets, such as coffee and cocoa.  In these markets, both sellers 
and buyers pay commission fees, as is the case in the Ethiopian grain market.      
 
In the Ethiopian grain market, a flat brokerage fee is compatible with broker 
incentives for several reasons.  First, brokers do not usually act as dual agents, 
and represent only one of the trading partners (Table 6).  Thus, they receive a 
commission from only one party in the transaction.   In a given transaction, both 
the seller’s agent and the buyer’s agent each receive a commission from their 
clients.  
 
Second, the service for which brokers are compensated is not price search, 
given that there is a spot price that prevails in the market, but rather the search 
for buyers or sellers.  For this reason, brokers maximize profit across a large 
volume of transactions in a short period of time, charging a small transaction fee.  
 
Third, and most importantly in the Ethiopian market, a flat commission limits 
cheating by brokers. Since brokers themselves determine the market price in the 
price discovery role described above, a percentage fee would bias the price 
discovery process and provide brokers with incentives to fix the prices to their 
advantage.  34 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Enhanced food security and the expansion of the Ethiopian market economy 
require the frequent and ready transfer of grain from surplus regions to deficit 
regions.  The effective functioning of the grain market depends on the ability of 
traders to exchange grain anonymously with buyers and sellers in distant 
markets, without risk of commitment failure.   This paper studied in depth the 
types of commitment problems that arise in a market with few formal institutions 
to deter opportunistic behavior.  Weak public market information, the lack of 
grain standardization, the oral nature of contracts, and limited legal enforcement 
of contracts are all factors that contribute to the difficulty that traders encounter 
in attempting to trade directly with an unknown partner.   In order to circumvent 
this commitment problem, traders face two alternatives: either to trade in a 
personalized fashion with partners whom they know well and with whom they 
have a trust-based relationship or to trade with an anonymous partner through 
the intermediation of a broker. 
 
Brokers have multiple functions in the grain market.  They are primarily engaged 
in matching buyers and sellers in what would otherwise be a time-consuming 
search process as well as in setting daily spot prices.  Because they have the 35 
trust of their clients, brokers act as inspectors and witnesses to each transaction 
and guarantee that the contract will be enforced.   This latter role supports 
impersonalized exchange in the Ethiopian grain market. 
 
Brokerage use varies by type of market and type of transaction.  Traders in 
surplus regions use brokerage more for sales while traders in deficit regions use 
brokerage more for purchases.  Traders in the central market use brokers 
considerably less.  
 
Traders’ dependence on brokerage varies across regions, with more traders in 
surplus regions indicating regular use of brokerage.    Similarly, traders in surplus 
regions tend to work exclusively with a single broker.  Relations between traders 
and brokers are generally long-term, with repeated interaction.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, ethnicity does not seem to be a motivating factor in the relations 
between traders and brokers. 
 
Despite repeated interaction and loyalty in trader-broker relations, the difficulty of 
monitoring brokers’ actions presents moral hazard problems for traders.  Brokers 
do not regularly provide their clients, particularly in surplus regions, with 
information on the identity of the trader with whom they have exchanged grain.   
Although agency relations are not fully transparent, there are relatively few 
instances of conflict between traders and brokers.  Conflict is avoided through 36 
established conventions that limit brokers’ opportunistic behavior and that are 
incentive-compatible for brokers.  These conventions are that brokers tend to be 
specialized in a certain region and thus handle a large number of clients from 
one market town.  This enables traders to exchange information regarding the 
broker amongst themselves and maintain a viable reputation mechanism that is 
based on collective sanctions of wrongdoing by the broker.  Second, brokers’ 
incentive compatibility is maintained by the norm that brokers generally never 
buy or sell on their own account and are remunerated with flat brokerage fees. 
 
Agency relations between brokers and traders are characterized by a system 
based on reputation, rather than trust.  In contrast to studies of networks or 
trader coalitions that are linked through a common ethnic or religious base and 
that function on the basis of trust, the structure of Ethiopian brokerage is self-
enforcing through the use of reputation and incentive-compatibility constraints on 
brokers’ operations.     37 
Table 1--Activities of Brokers 
 
  Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 
Number of Markets That Broker Contacts 
 
 
       5.80 (2.70) 
Total Number of Clients 
      Number of Local Buyer Clients 
      Number of Distant Buyer Clients 
      Number of Local Seller Clients 
      Number of Distant Seller Clients 
 
     60.50 (32.27) 
     11.20 (15.77) 
       7.44 (5.75) 
       2.10 (5.38) 
     38.44 (17.18) 
Total Buyer Clients 
 
     13.30 (15.36) 
Total Seller Clients 
 
     46.62 (18.76) 
Share of Distant Buyer Clients With  
Whom Can Work Solely by Telephone 
 
     19.63 (37.21) 
Share of Distant Seller Clients With  
Whom Can Work Solely by Telephone 
 
     76.77 (35.83) 
Share of Buyer Clients To Whom  
Broker Would Offer Buyer Credit 
 
     32.22 (34.58) 
Share of Seller Clients To Whom  
Broker Would Offer Sales Advance 
 
     41.15 (43.62) 
Storage Capacity (quintals
a) 
     Quantity Currently of Own Stock 
     Quantity Currently of Rental to Clients 
 
   928.93 (758.02) 
   446.25 (853.49) 
   198.75 (231.40) 
Total Number of Employees 
      Full-time salaried 
      Full-time non-salaried 
      Daily wage workers 
      
    14.85 (10.33) 
        .85 (  1.34) 
      2.54 (  1.45) 
    10.93 (  9.20) 
Average Weekly Transactions (quintals) 
      January 1996 
      February 1996 
      March 1996 
      April  1996 
      May 1996 
      June 1996 
 
   2777.27 (2106.11) 
   2788.64 (2302.75) 
   2543.18 (2089.32) 
   1411.36 (1394.96) 
   1752.27 (1856.56) 
   1956.82 (1671.23) 
   
Source:  Author’s survey, 1996 
a A quintal is equivalent to a 100 kg. sack. 38 
Table 2--Price Discovery Role of Brokers 
 
  Share of Sample 
 




Frequency of Price Changes 
       Daily 






  Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 
 




                   18.77 (11.25) 
Number of Prices Set Daily 
 
                     7.30 (3.47) 
Time Required to Set Each Price                       6.20 (4.80) 
   












Table 3--Contractual Choices of All Traders 
(% shares of total transacted quantities)
a 
 









 Total Share 
(N=152) 
 

































Source:  Author’s survey, 1996 
a  Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4--Rationale for Choice of Broker’s Services 
 
Reasons to Work 
with Broker: 
       Count            
    Percentage 
Reasons Not to 




Broker has better 




        28 
     24.8% 
 
 
I trade with partners 
whom I know closely 
 
 
             28 
          25.9% 
Broker acts as 
guarantor 
 
        11 
       9.7% 
 
I know the market 
well enough 
             57 
          52.8% 
Broker has more 
contacts 
        44 
      38.9% 
 
Brokers cheat on 
prices 
              7 




          9 
        8.0% 
I want to save 
commission fees 
            10 
           9.3% 
I have no choice           12 
       10.6% 
I don’t need a quick 
transaction 
             5 





           2 






             1 
           0.9% 
Less costly to work 
with broker 
           7 
        6.2% 
 




        113 
        100% 
   
          108 
          100% 
Source:   Author’s trader surveys, 1996 41 
Table 5--Profile of Brokers and Traders 
 
Characteristics 
  Brokers: 
  Mean (Standard Dev.) 
Traders: 
Mean (Standard Dev.) 
Age 
 
36.21 (11.49)    32.83 (12.32) 
Years of Operation as Broker 
 
  8.77 (7.63)    10.41 (8.76) 
Years of Schooling 
 
  8.29 (4.41)      9.61 (3.64) 
Working capital 
 
79,750  (100,805)   55,184 (62,647) 
Share of Transactions on Own Account    9.1 (11.66)   
Characteristics  % of Brokers  % of Traders 
Mother tongue 
    Oromigna 
    Amharigna 
    Tigrigna 
    Guraguigna 
  
 14.3 
 64.3  
 14.3 
   7.1 
 
  17.8 
  69.1 
    8.6 
    4.6 
Religion 
     Muslim 
     Christian Orthodox 








     Farmer 








Father in Grain Brokerage 
 
 40.0   
Own Transport Vehicle 
 
 28.6     5.9 
Own Telephone 
 
 71.4   38.8 
Specialization of Business 
     Primary Work as Broker 
     Only Brokerage 
     Brokerage and Wholesale 




  42.9 
  35.7 
  21.4 
 
Ranking of Services Offered 
     Search for Partner 
     Provide Market Information 
     Act as Guarantor of Transaction 
     Provide Credit 
 
   1 
   2 
   3 
   4 
 
 
Source:  Author’s survey, 1996 42 
Table 6 -- Broker Relations with Trader Clients 
   % of Respondents 
 
Basis of Broker-Trader Relations 
       referral 
       common region 
       anonymous meeting 
 
 
     
         50.0 
         42.9 
           7.1 
Flat fee payment 
 
         92.9 
When no partner is found for client: 
       Broker charges client for storage 
       Broker rents outside space for client 
       Broker buys/sells grain at market price 
       Broker stores grain without charge        
 
 
         71.4 
           7.1 
           7.1 
         14.3 
If partners meet, future direct exchange is likely 
 
         21.4 
  Mean (standard deviation) 
 
Share of Long-Term Clients 
 
 
         87.43 (13.85) 
Share of Distant Buyer Clients from Same Region 
 
         16.00 (35.02) 
Share of Distant Seller Clients from Same Region 
 
         17.89 (34.79) 
Type of Agency
a  
         Represent both buyer and seller 
         Represent buyer only  
         Represent seller only  
 
 
           7.36 (26.68) 
         16.21 (28.49) 
         76.43 (35.60) 
      
Broker’s Actions
 a: 
        Immediate Matching of Partners 
        No Match - Rent Storage to Client  
        No Match - Buy or Sell on Own Account 
 
 
         77.53 (11.12) 
         17.00 (10.68) 
           6.68 (11.06) 
Transparence during match
 a  
         Only buyer present 
         Only seller present 
         Both buyer and seller present 
         Neither buyer nor seller present 
 
        37.36 (23.59) 
          3.73 (13.45) 
        53.68 (26.37) 
            .77 (1.88)                  
   
Source:  Author’s survey, 1996 
a  Represents shares of  brokers’ transactions over recall period. 43 
Table 7--Traders’ Relations with Brokers 
    Uses Brokerage   Could not operate Works exclusively Years of exclusive From same region Kinship ties 




  with broker 
Region    (%)    (%)    (%)    (mean, std. dev.)  (%)    (%)   
                           
Surplus Markets                         
                           
Wollega    100.0    70.0    92.3      4.11 (3.96) 
 
66.7    0.0   
Arsi    100.0    44.4    100.0    13.75 (11.76) 
 
8.3    0.0   
Gojjam    92.3    26.3    74.4      4.11 (2.87) 
 
9.7    2.7   
Deficit Markets 
 
                     
Wollo    89.5    42.9    78.9      4.96 (5.48) 
 
46.2    17.6   
Tigray    100.0    0.0    42.9      2.50 (2.18) 
 
30.8    0.0   
Harar    100.0    0.0    44.4      3.57 (3.15) 
 
54.5    0.0   
Central Market 
 
                     
Addis Ababa 
 
54.1    0.0    21.6      3.87 (3.12) 
 
25.0    5.6   
 
Total 
   
85.5 
   
33.8 





  5.60 (6.55) 
 
26.4 
   
3.9 
 
Source:  Author’s survey, 1996 44 
Table 8-- Transparency in Trader-Broker Relations 
 










creates conflict  
    (% of traders)  (% of traders)  (% of transactions 
mean, std. dev.) 
(% of traders)  (% of traders) 
Region                       
Surplus Markets                     
Wollega    76.9    0.0    44.09 (44.32)  63.6    57.1   
                       
Arsi    66.7    33.3    60.91 (37.74)  54.5    50.0   
                       
Gojjam    86.5    65.5    73.67 (33.50)  100.0    16.7   
                       
Deficit Markets                     
                       
Wollo    64.7    41.7    41.07 (47.64)  28.6    25.0   
                       
Tigray    100.0    100.0    94.58 (14.37)  91.7    27.3   
                       
Harar    81.3    81.3    90.88 (20.02)  94.1    75.0   
                       




   
64.7 
 
   












   50.0 
 
Total 
   
78.6 
   
   63.7 




           
         39.3 
Source:  Author’s survey, 1996. 45 
Table 9 -- Conflict in Trader-Broker Relations 
 
    Trader had 
















No. of conflicts with  
partner without use 
of broker
1 
Region  (% of traders)  (mean,s.d.)  (% of traders)  (% of traders)  (mean, s.d.)    (mean, s.d.)   
 
Surplus  Markets 
                    
Wollega    38.5    3.55 (6.30)  100.0    0.0    1.55 (2.46)    1.55 (3.01)   
                         
Arsi    41.7     .73 (1.56)  60.0    0.0    0.0   (0.0)      .73 (1.42)   
                         
Gojjam    29.7    1.50 (1.98)  50.0    0.0    1.40 (2.58)      .27 ( .69)   
                         
Deficit Markets                       
Wollo    17.6     .57 (.94)  66.7    0.0    1.09 (1.76)    1.50 (2.02)   
                         
Tigray    25.0     .75 (1.06)  66.7    0.0    2.83 (5.17)    1.36 (3.04)   
                         
Harar    50.0    1.25 (1.69)  40.0    20.0      .53 (1.23)      .65 (1.46)   
                         
Central Market                       
Addis Ababa  42.1    2.07 (2.99)  100.0    0.0      .87 (1.60)    4.73 (5.11)   
                         
Total    34.1    1.47 (2.73)  65.2    4.3    1.20 (2.58)    1.38 (2.88)   
Source:  Author’s survey, 1996. 
1  Over a recall period of 1 marketing year.46 














Figure 2--Contractual Choices by Type of Market and Type of Transaction 
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Source:  Author’s survey, 1996.48 
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